

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----041184 011040Z /23

R 010822Z NOV 77

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2145

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 4636

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, UR, SW

SUBJ: SWEDISH REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY DETENTE
IN EUROPE

REF: STATE 257381

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS FROM MFA SEC GEN LEIF LEIFLAND COPY OF A MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED IN THE POLITICAL DIVISION OF MFA ON SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE AND PROPOSED SWEDISH REACTION TO THEM. MEMO HAS BEEN APPROVED BY FONMIN KARIN SODER, AND LEIFLAND FEELS IT WILL CERTAINLY RECEIVE NOD OF ENTIRE GOVERNMENT. THE FOLLOWS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF ENTIRE TEXT.

2. "POLITICAL DIVISION, UNIT 1 MEMORANDUM, OCTOBER 27, 1977, COMMENTS IN REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON MEASURES FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE:

"THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN ITS CURRENT FORM ON OCTOBER 21 BY PARTY CHIEF BREZHNEV IN A DINNER SPEECH HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF INDIAN PRIME MINISTER DESAI TO MOSCOW. IT WAS PRESENTED AT THE CSCE MEETING IN BELGRADE BY THE SOVIET CHIEF DELEGATE VORONTSOV... THE QUESTION WAS BROUGHT BEFORE

THE MFA BY SOVIET EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY KUGUJENKO IN A VISIT TO SECTION 1 OF THE POLITICAL DIVISION ON OCTOBER 24... KUGUJENKO RETURNED THE FOLLOWING DAY TO ONCE AGAIN SOUND OUT THE SWEDISH POSITION. IT HAS FURTHER BEEN POINTED OUT THE BEFOREHAND THAT AMBASSADOR JAKOVLEV INTENDS TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE MINISTRY. THE VARIOUS POINTS IN THE PROPOSAL ARE ALL OF A CHARACTER THAT WOULD FAVOUR THE WARSAW PACT'S INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF NATO. AN OFFICIAL SWEDISH REACTION IS NOT YET AT HAND. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN THIS CONNECTION".

"(1) 'NON VIRST USE' OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THIS PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN THE FALL OF 1976 BY THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. IN BILATERAL CSCE TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS IN JANUARY 1977, THE FOLLOWING SWEDISH COMMENTARY WAS GIVEN:

"(A) THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF REDUCING THE RISKS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN OUR VIEW THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS, BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATION REDUCE AND EVENTUALLY ABOLISH THEIR ARSENALS OF SUCH WEAPONS.

"(B) PENDING THIS, WE NATURALLY WELCOME EVERY EXPRESSION OF POLITICAL WILL WHICH CAN BE JUDGED IN A REALISTIC WAY TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE RISKS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CONCERNING COMMITMENTS FOR THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONFIDENTIAL

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SWEDEN HAS WORKED SO THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS--SO-CALLED NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES--WOULD BE GIVEN BY THE NUCLEAR STATES TO THE NON-NUCLEAR SIGNATORIES OF THE NPT (NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY). SUCH GUARANTEES SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE NPT AND FACILITATE INCREASED ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY. CONCERNING COMMITMENTS ON NON-FIRST USE, THESE OUGHT TO BE SPELLED OUT BETWEEN STATES OR ALLIANCES WHICH POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CSCE IS CONSEQUENTLY AN INAPPROPRIATE FORUM. FOR ITS OWN PART, SWEDEN HAS ADHERED TO THE NPT AND IN THIS WAY THROUGH ITS ACTION SHOWN ITS INTENTION NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

"(C) NATO'S NEGATIVE REACTION WAS NO SURPRISE. BOTH WE AND THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT NATO CONSIDERS THAT SUCH A TREATY WOULD UPSET THE GENERAL BALANCE OF FORCES TO THE WARSAW PACT'S ADVANTAGE. THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT REALIZTIC IN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

"(2) THE COMMITMENT NOT TO EXPAND THE MEMBERSHIP OF MILITARY ALLIANCES:

"THIS PROPOSAL HAS ALSO BEEN DECIDLY REJECTED BY NATO, WHICH SEES SPAIN AS A POSSIBLE NEW MEMBER, REFERRING TO THE CSCE

DOCUMENT, WHOSE FIRST PRINCIPLE IS TO ESTABLISH THE SOVEREIGN
RIGHT OF STATES TO BE OR NOT TO BE MEMBERS OF ALLIANCES. THIS
ACCORDS WITH THE TRADITIONAL SWEDISH LINE THAT EVERY STATE
HAS THE RIGHT TO ELABORATE ITS OWN SECURITY POLICY. FOR OUR PART,
WE RESPECT THOSE SOLUTIONS WHICH OTHER STATES HAVE ARRIVED AT IN

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THIS REGARD. BOTH IN HELSINKI AND BELGRADE WE HAVE POINTED
OUT THAT THE CURRENT PATTERN FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY CAN UNDERGO
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LONG RUN, BUT THAT ONE CANNOT COUNT ON
THIS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION,
IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL
AS REALISTIC, EVEN IF IT IS NATURALLY INCUMBENT ON THE PACT-
ASSOCIATED STATES TO TAKE A POSITION.

"(3) CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND 'PARTICIPANT CEILING'
IN MILITARY MANEUVERS

"REGARDING CBM'S SWEDEN HAS WORKED AS A DRIVING FORCE AND
WE LOOK POSITIVELY IN PRINCIPLE ON AGREEMENTS WHICH STRENGTHEN
CONFIDENCE. WE SHARE THE VIEW ADVANCED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL
THAT SUCH MEASURES CAN ACTIVITY CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL AND
MILITARY DETENTE. WE STATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET FORMU-
LATION ON THIS POINT DOES NOT INDICATE ANY INTEREST IN IMPROVING

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ALREADY AGREED-UPON CBM'S. REGARDING THE PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN MILITARY MANEUVERS, WE CAN STATE ON THE SWEDISH SIDE THAT THE SUGGESTED NUMERICAL STRENGTH WIDELY EXCEEDS ANYTHING WHICH WOULD INVOLVE US. THE POINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST NATO, IN WHOSE MANEUVER STRUCTURE EXERCISES OF THIS MAGNITUDE ARE OFTEN INCLUDED. THE WARSAW PACT'S EXERCISES USUALLY TAKE PLACE ON A LESSOR SCALE.

"(4) SPECIAL CONFERENCE

"THE PROPOSAL TO INITIATE 'SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS' ON THESE QUESTIONS PARALLEL WITH THE M(B)FR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA CAN BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO TAKE THIS WHOLE SUBJECT AREA AWAY FROM THE CSCE AND CREATE A COMPETING CONFERENCE MACHINERY. THIS APPEARS TO US TO BE NEITHER REALISTIC NOR WEL-MOTIVATED. AS IS SO OFTEN ASSERTED, THE CSCE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A BALANCED WHOLE, WHOSE DIFFERENCE PARTS ARE CAREFULLY BALANCED IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER. THIS BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY IF THE CBM PORTION WERE TO BE DISLODGED. WERE SUCH AN EXTRA CONFERENCE TO COME INTO BEING, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT OTHER THAN THE SOVIET PROPOSALS COULD BE TAKEN UP FOR CONSIDERATION. IT COULD BECOME A VERY DRAWN-OUT PROCESS JUST TO AGREE UPON AN AGENDA, BECAUSE THE CONSENSUS RULE FROM THE CSCE MUST PRESUMABLY BE VALID. FINALLY, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SWEDEN, LIKE MANY OTHER SMALLER STATES, HAS A LIMITED FREEDOM OF ACTION AND COULD PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER WIDE-RANGING EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CAN, HOWEVER, ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD AS AN EXPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT EXPERT GROUPS IN DIFFERENT QUESTIONS DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN BELGRADE AND THE NEXT FOLLOW-UP MEETING. IN SUCH A CASE, THERE ARE REASONS TO BEAR THE PROPOSAL IN MIND AND TO TRY AND ESTABLISH AN EXPERT GROUP WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTINUING WORK WITH CMB

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QUESTIONS AFTER THE BELGRADE MEETING. THE RISK EXISTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE RUSSIANS IN THIS WAY ARE TRYING TO PREVENT CBM DECISIONS FROM BEING TAKEN IN BELGRADE.

"(5) STOCKHOLM AS A CONFERENCE SITE:

"THE IDEA OF LOCATING TALKS ON THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL IN STOCKHOLM WAS PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION HEAD IN BELGRADE IN A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ARVIDSSON. NO FORMAL PRO-

POSAL HAS BEEN PRESENTED FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. CONSIDERING
THE ACTIVE ROLE SWEDEN PLAYED IN THE CBM CONNECTION, STOCKHOLM
CAN BE SAID TO BE A VERY NATURAL MEETING PLACE, IF SUCH TALKS
COME INTO BEING AT THE EXPERT LEVEL. THIS WOULD ALSO INCLUDE
A DESIRABLE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION OF MEETING
PLACES INSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE. FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE,
WE NORMALLY DO NOT SEEK ACTIVELY TO GET INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
LOCATED IN STOCKHOLM. IF IT SHOULD BE A GENERAL WISH TO LOCATE
TALKS OF THIS KIND IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE
NO REASON TO REJECT THAT."
KENNEDY-MINOTT

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